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The history of the past four decades of
the theory and application of additive
conjoint measurement (ACM) is charac-
terized by vivid developments of its the-
oretical foundation (cf. Luce and Tukey,
1964; Krantz et al., 1971, 2006; Narens,
1974), industrious developments of sta-
tistical and computational implementa-
tions (cf. Karabatsos and Ullrich, 2002;
Karabatsos and Sheu, 2004; Karabatsos,
2005; Myung et al., 2005) and heated
debates about its applicability and signif-
icance in psychology (cf. Michell, 1997,
2009; Borsboom and Mellenbergh, 2004;
Barrett, 2008; Borsboom and Scholten,
2008; Kyngdon, 2008a; Trendler, 2009).
What started as a promising founda-
tion to solve the everlasting debate about
the quantitative nature of psychological
attributes (Ferguson et al., 1939) ended in
perseverative debates with very little trans-
fer to mainstream psychological science
still being dominated by structural equa-
tion modeling (SEM) and item response
theory (IRT). After reading the aforemen-
tioned articles, and comparing their impli-
cations with the day-to-day business of
mainstream psychological science, even an
unbiased reader would certainly agree with
Cliff (1992) that ACM was a “. . . revolution
that never happened” (p. 186).
It is not the aim of this article, to
discredit the efforts of mathematical psy-
chology and proponents of ACM in par-
ticular. I just want to address the naïve
but relevant question why ACM as a
stringent way to formalize and to test
the requirements of quantitative mea-
surement in psychology has not been
embraced by mainstream psychology as a
means to an end to test what they always
claim: that most of the attributes (e.g.,
intelligence and personality factors) are
quantitative.
An attribute possessing a quantitative
structure is required to satisfy the three
conditions of ordinality (transitivity, anti-
symmetry, and strong connexity) and the
six conditions of additivity (associativity,
commutativity, monotonicity, solvability,
positivity, and the Archimedean condition;
cf. Michell, 1990, p. 52f.). Most of these
conditions are testable hypotheses but I
have never seen any empirical test in psy-
chological articles before data were ana-
lyzed with SEM or IRT models, which
already assume the quantitative structure
of the attributes under consideration as
argued below. Somewhere during my psy-
chology studies at the university I learned
that psychology is an empirical science and
that there is therefore no room for claims
that should just be believed. However,
given the assumed but almost never tested
quantitative nature of most of the psy-
chological attributes as reflected in factor
analysis, SEM and IRT models, I must have
missed or misunderstood something.
RESISTANCE TOWARD INCONVENIENT
TRUTH
The question arises why debates about
testing the assumption of quantitative
measurement more rigorously emerge
from time to time without any broader
impact on psychological measurement
with a few exceptions (Luce, 2000;
Kyngdon, 2011). Any attempt to answer
this question will, of course, be incom-
plete, so that I will suggest a factor that
might be of special importance: psychol-
ogist’s avoidance toward falsifiability and
hence, toward inconvenient truth.
A number of authors state (cf.
Borsboom and Mellenbergh, 2004;
Borsboom and Scholten, 2008; Fisher,
2011) that the axiomatic structure of
ACM is too restrictive with respect to the
regularities in the order relations of the
items, the examinees, and an ordinal index
of the probability of a correct response.
ACM relates to situations in which one
attribute (P; e.g., the probability of getting
an item correct) is related additively to two
others (A the ability and B the item diffi-
culty) such that P = f (A + B) (where f is
any positive monotonic function). In fact,
the requirements of ACM are rarely ful-
filled in applied psychological data (Cliff,
1992; Michell, 2009) because the data must
satisfy the highly restrictive conditions of
double cancelation, solvability, and the
Archimedian axiom (cf. Michell, 1990).
Satisfaction of these requirements implies
that A and B are additive and are therefore
quantitative (cf. Krantz et al., 1971).
I therefore agree with the argument that
it is more than questionable why such
rigorous measurement structures could
be found in psychological data. As illus-
trated elsewhere (cf. Schönemann, 1994;
Heene, 2011) psychology seemed to be
overwhelmed by the successful applica-
tion of mathematics in classical physics
and invented “. . . models with close refer-
ence to those of classical physics, which
were then applied to psychological obser-
vations” (Heene, 2011, p. 53; italics in the
original). This approach ignores that the
development of mathematical models has
been closely interwoven with the empir-
ical observation of invariant phenomena
in physics implying that the mathematical
models have often been derived from those
phenomena (see also Sherry, 2011).
On the other hand, the tools of main-
stream psychology such as SEM and IRT
make exactly these strong assumptions
about the quantitative structure of psycho-
logical attributes. But avoiding any tests
of quantitative measurement but apply-
ing methods making the assumption of
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quantity appears to be nothing more than
a self-delusion that one bears something
valuable instead of being in fact empty-
handed. This all too strong tendency
to avoid falsification is probably deeply
rooted in the scientifically unhealthy polit-
ical/economical aspiration of psychology
(Vautier et al., 2012) which keeps the
machine for paper-producing and grant-
funding well-oiled but also leading to a
severe publication bias. Consider Levine
et al. (2009) who showed that effect size
and sample size are negatively correlated
in 80% of meta-analyses. Consider Fanelli
(2010, p. 4) who found that “. . . the odds
of reporting a positive result were around
five times higher for papers published in
Psychology and Psychiatry and Economics
and Business than in Space Science” (see
also Fanelli, 2009, 2012; Bones, 2012).
Despite these numbers, the possibly best
evidence of my claims comes from a log-
ical argument: has anyone ever seen arti-
cles using SEM, IRT, or Rasch models in
which the author admitted the falsifica-
tion of his/her hypotheses? On the con-
trary, it appears that stringent model tests
are mostly carefully avoided in favor of
insensitive “goodness-of-fit indices” (cf.
Karabatsos, 2001; Heene et al., 2011).
Given that the empirical foundation
for ACM might seldom be given it is
then reasonable to apply more flexible
measurement models such as the Rasch
model (Rasch, 1981) which some authors
regard as a probabilistic formulation of
ACM (Perline et al., 1979) and also leading
to interval-level measurement. Kyngdon
(2008b), however, argues that there is no
basis for this claim by showing that param-
eters of IRT and Rasch models are only
invariant against positive monotone trans-
formations. Thus, if both the Rasch model
and the more general three-parameter
logistic model fit a data set, only the
order upon the person ability estimates
produced by these models remains invari-
ant. Hence, as only order is preserved
under positive monotone transformation
(Narens, 1981), the fit of an IRT or a Rasch
model, respectively, may in fact not be
indicative of quantity, but of order.
Moreover, justification for using the
Rasch model relates frequently to the argu-
ment that random error forms a funda-
mental that is, non-ignorable feature of
every psychological response process and
must therefore be included in any model
formulation (cf. Borsboom and Scholten,
2008; Fisher, 2011). Since the Rasch model
as a probabilistic model accounts for ran-
dom error it seems to be the panacea
of the measurement problems in psy-
chology. However, the magic of obtaining
an interval-scale for items and examinees
comes with a price because the Rasch
model’s status as a quantitative theory
is derived exclusively through the error
term as Michell (2008) pointed out. With
the Rasch model, if the error was elim-
inated, the slope of the item response
curves would become infinite, resulting in
step-functions of the Guttman model and
the “measurements” of the Rasch model
reduce only to mere order. But elimi-
nating error must by definition lead to
better measurement, not the impossibil-
ity of measurement. Nevertheless, Sijtsma
(2012) has recently argued that this rea-
soning is incorrect:
The Guttman model divides the latent
variable scale into disjoint and exhaus-
tive intervals in which differences
 − δj do not affect response proba-
bilities. The Rasch model assumes these
differences to have a monotone relation-
ship to response probabilities. From the
viewpoint of IRT, the Guttman model
ignores the information contained in
the intervals, thus paying the price of a
lower measurement level. (p. 14)
I do not see why this line of argumentation
refutes Michell’s (2008) “Rasch paradox”.
Sijtsma’s reasoning presupposes that the
latent trait is continuous. Furthermore, we
can only ignore information “. . . contained
in the intervals” when there already is
interval-level information, but this is not
at all self-evident but simply an assump-
tion of IRT.
This uncomfortable situation that psy-
chometric models cannot work with-
out “error,” has lead in my opinion, to
great statistical hand wringing and argu-
mentative acrobatics to avoid falsifica-
tion of the quantitaty assumption. This
line of argumentation is often linked
to the demonstration of correspondences
between psychology and physics.
For instance, Fisher (2011) claims that
the probabilistic nature of the Rasch
model reflects the physical phenomenon
of stochastic resonance (SR) within a
biological system. Simply put, SR states
that an output signal-to-noise ratio of a
nonlinear threshold system is improved
by moderate values of input noise inten-
sity (cf. McNamara and Wiesenfeld, 1989).
The weak and normally undetectable sig-
nal becomes then detectable due to reso-
nance between the signal and the added
stochastic noise because the added noise
will occasionally lead to an exceeding of a
threshold value of the periodic force (see
Gammaitoni et al., 1998, for illustrative
examples). A plethora of physical, biologi-
cal and neurophysiological systems, as well
as some phenomena from linguistics and
visual perception can be described by SR
which has been indirectly shown by apply-
ing both the signal and the noise exter-
nally to receptors and neurons or by data
simulations (cf. Simonotto et al., 1997;
Gammaitoni et al., 1998; Moskowitz and
Dickinson, 2002).
Although it is intriguing to regard SR
as a valid justification for probabilistic
item response models in order to capture
randomness, such an extrapolation is far-
fetched because it is not at all self-evident
why and how such micro-level phenomena
can be extrapolated to the macro-level of
item responses. Moreover, because present
results on SR in biological systems bear on
indirect evidence, the general applicabil-
ity of SR to such systems is far from being
clear as noted by McDonnell and Abbott
(2009):
Adding noise to external stimuli can-
not prove that neurons or brain func-
tion depend on consistently available
internal sources of randomness, i.e., on
endogenous neural noise. The challenge
is to devise an experiment that can
remove naturally occurring healthy vari-
ability and demonstrate that function
is impaired solely due to that removal.
(p. 6)
It appears that borrowing examples from
the natural sciences and relating them to
the (error) structure of probabilistic item
response models might be a persuading
analogy but is not a convincing justifica-
tion for the probabilistic nature of item
response models. Explicit cognitive theo-
ries of the test item response process are
needed, but psychometrics is profoundly
lacking in such theories (Kyngdon, 2011).
Furthermore, no experimental evidence
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currently exists which shows why and how
such system-inherent error might occur in
the item response process.
Finally, I just wonder why psychome-
tricians have yet ignored the success ACM
has within theories of utility and decision
making in psychology (“prospect theory”;
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) in which
ACM served as a formal proof. While it is
true that human choice behavior did not
strictly follow the requirements of ACM
and research has discovered paradoxes of
human choice behavior (Birnbaum, 2008),
it is also clear that these observations have
led to falsifications of old theories of choice
behavior and the development of new ones
that account for persistent violations of
coalescing and first order stochastic dom-
inance (e.g., Birnbaum, 2008; Luce et al.,
2008). Frankly speaking, I have very rarely
seen such an attitude within mainstream
psychometrics be it IRT/Rasch or SEM
where items are omitted from tests, pow-
erless but flattering item-fit statistics are
commonly used (Karabatsos, 2001), and
correlated error terms are specified (Cole
et al., 2007) to get a reasonable model-fit
and to construct support for one’s own the
theory despite doubtful consequences (cf.
Bones, 2012; Ferguson and Heene, 2012).
CONCLUSION
Altogether, it is possible that human cog-
nitive abilities and personality traits sim-
ply are not quantitative. ACM might
be in fact too severe for practical test-
ing purposes. However, psychometricians
continue to argue that cognitive abilities
are quantitative and measurable “latent
traits” (Markus and Borsboom, 2012). If
this argument is correct, then once item
response error is controlled, test score
response data should be consistent with
the cancellation axioms of ACM. Thus,
more direct experimentation is needed
instead of more sophisticated IRT models.
It is still unclear and an unsolved prob-
lem what SEM and IRT models, notably
the Rasch model, add to the clarifica-
tion of the quantity problem in psy-
chology. It is furthermore unclear what
insights into empirical phenomena it pro-
vides as even attempts to explain the
error structure seem to be premature. It
is mostly forgotten that Rasch himself
did not derive his model from empirical
observations but “. . . within [Rasch’s] own
mathematical playground—with no rela-
tion to any actual item analysis problem!”
(Rasch, 1979). It is not necessarily wrong
to develop mathematical models indepen-
dently from empirical observations. But, it
is also not at all self-evident that empiri-
cal insights will result from such models,
be it an IRT, SEM, or ACM. However,
by avoiding tests of the assumption of
a quantitative structure of psychological
attributes, psychologists have yet failed to
make progress on the basis of the funda-
mental scientific principle of falsification
and in regard to their most fundamental
assumptions of quantitative psychological
attributes.
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